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PROTECTION CHALLENGES
Sandy De Sousa*
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Jane Doe was born in San Juan, Puerto Rico on February 3, 1955. In
1957, several days short of her second birthday, Jane’s family left Puerto
Rico for the Dominican Republic, where Jane resided until the age of twentyfive. While living in the Dominican Republic, Jane met a Dominican man
with whom she had an out-of-wedlock child, John Doe. By 1998, John had
moved to the United States to take up residence in New York. But John’s
residency came to a halt in 2003, when he was placed in removal proceedings
due to several criminal convictions. In opposing removal, John claimed he
acquired U.S. citizenship at birth based on the U.S. citizenship of his
biological mother. An immigration judge accepted John’s citizenship claim
and terminated John’s removal proceedings.
Notably, if one particular detail of John Doe’s story were altered—if,
instead, John were born abroad to an unwed U.S.-citizen father rather than
an unwed U.S.-citizen mother—his claim to birthright citizenship would
have been denied, leaving him vulnerable to removal. More specifically,
John’s mother, Jane Doe, satisfied § 1409(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act’s (“INA”) requirement of one-year physical presence in the
United States because she spent the first year of her life in the United States.2
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2013,
Montclair State University. I am thankful to Professor Solangel Maldonado for introducing
me to the Morales-Santana decision, sparking my interest in this subject matter, and to my
faculty advisor, Professor Lori Nessel, for her guidance in the writing of this Comment. I am
also deeply thankful to my family for their unwavering love and support.
1
The name of this individual and the facts of her story are fabricated for purposes of
this Comment.
2
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018)) provides the framework for acquisition of U.S.
citizenship at birth by a child born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent and a parent who is a citizen
of another nation.
Under the terms of the INA, the joint conduct of a citizen and an alien
that results in conception is not sufficient to produce an American citizen,
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In contrast, if John’s U.S.-citizen parent were his father, a one-year presence
in the United States would not suffice to confer citizenship because an unwed
father must demonstrate a five-year physical presence in the United States
prior to the child’s birth.3
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this gender
demarcation in Sessions v. Morales-Santana.4 In an effort to halt his removal
proceedings, Luis Ramon Morales-Santana asserted U.S. citizenship at birth
as derived from his U.S.-citizen father.5 The Supreme Court rejected his
citizenship claim, however, affirming that Morales-Santana’s father was
twenty days short of meeting the then-applicable ten-year physical presence
requirement of § 1401(g).6 Even further, the Supreme Court held that the
regardless of whether the citizen parent is the male or the female partner.
If the two parties engage in a second joint act—if they agree to marry one
another—citizenship will follow.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433 (1998). Accordingly, certain provisions of the INA
determine the ability of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers and fathers, “acting separately, to confer
citizenship on a child born outside of the United States.” Id. The general rule for determining
who “shall be nationals . . . at birth” is found in § 1401, which provides for the U.S. citizenship
of
a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its
outlying possessions [to married] parents one of whom is an alien, and
the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such
person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying
possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at
least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years.
8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018) (emphasis added). Further, § 1409 incorporates and extends “by
reference the physical-presence requirements of § 1401” to children of unmarried parents,
thereby allowing an “unwed citizen parent to transmit U.S. citizenship to a foreign-born child
under the same terms as a married citizen parent.” Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct.
1678, 1687 (2017); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2018). Section 1409(c), however, provides
an exception to the physical presence requirement of §§ 1401 and 1409(a) for U.S.-citizen
mothers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2018). Under this exception, “only one year of continuous
physical presence is required before unwed mothers may pass [U.S.] citizenship to their
children born abroad.” Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1687 (emphasis added); see also §
1409(c).
3
See § 1401(g); cf. § 1409(c).
4
137 S. Ct. at 1686.
5
Id.
6
Id. “The law in effect at the time of birth governs whether a child obtained derivative
citizenship as of his or her birth. Accordingly, the 1952 Act provide[d] the statutory
framework applicable to Morales-Santana’s nationality claim.” Morales-Santana v. Lynch,
804 F.3d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2017) (citation omitted). The 1952 Act included a physicalpresence requirement of ten years for unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, five of which must have
been met after the age of fourteen, and a one-year physical-presence requirement for unwed
U.S.-citizen mothers. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g) (1952) (amended 1986) (substituting
“five years, at least two” for “ten years, at least five”), 1409(c). The current version of the
statute reduces the physical-presence requirement for unwed fathers to five years; however,
“[t]he reduction affects only children born on or after November 14, 1986” and “[b]ecause
Morales-Santana was born in 1962, his challenge [wa]s to the ten-years, five-after-age-14
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gender-based differential in §§ 1401(g) and 1409(c) violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.7 To remedy the equal protection
violation, the Court chose to remove the benefit that the statute conferred on
mothers, rather than follow its customary approach of extending the benefit
to the aggrieved class (the fathers).8 In other words, the Court eliminated the
one-year exception for unwed mothers, thereby applying the current fiveyear residency requirement to unwed fathers and mothers.9 MoralesSantana is, thus, an anomalous ruling in the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence, particularly in light of Congress’s nearly complete power over
immigration laws.10
In the wake of Morales-Santana, commentators have critiqued the
decision from two related perspectives. Some contend that Morales-Santana
adds to a line of Supreme Court decisions11 that signals an erosion of the
Court’s longstanding deference to the political branches in immigration
matters.12 Congress has traditionally exercised broad and nearly exclusive
authority over immigration policy-making—a principle that is often referred
to as the “plenary power doctrine.”13 Yet, there has been a recent “chipping
requirement applicable at the time of his birth.” 137 S. Ct. at 1687 n.3 (internal citation
omitted). Nevertheless, the disparity in treatment of unwed U.S.-citizen fathers and unwed
U.S.-citizen mothers persists in the current statute. See §§ 1401(g), 1409(a), (c).
7
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1686 n.1 (“As this case involve[d] federal, not state,
legislation, the applicable equality guarantee is not the Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit
Equal Protection Clause, it is the guarantee implicit in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.”) (internal citation omitted).
8
Id. at 1698–1701.
9
Id. at 1701 (“Going forward, Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform
prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender. In the
interim, as the Government suggests, § 1401[(g)]’s now-five-year requirement should apply,
prospectively, to children born to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.”).
10
See Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in Morales-Santana, 131
HARV. L. REV. 170, 174 (2017) (arguing that the Morales-Santana “opinion marks the first
time that modern equality principles of any sort have served as grounds for the Court to
invalidate a statute governing the acquisition of citizenship”).
11
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
12
See David Rubenstein, Immigration Symposium: The Future of Immigration
Exceptionalism, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/immigra
tion-symposium-future-immigration-exceptionalism/; Allissa Wickham, Citizenship Ruling
May
Spell
Trouble
for
Plenary
Power,
LAW360 (June
13,
2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/933945/citizenship-ruling-may-spell-trouble-for-plenarypower (“One of the most notable developments [in Session v. Morales-Santana] may be that
the Supreme Court decided to apply constitutional analysis to immigration law at all, bucking
what’s known as the plenary power doctrine . . . .”).
13
See Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration Policy?, CTR.
FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Feb. 25, 2009), https://cis.org/Report/Plenary-Power-Should-JudgesControl-US-Immigration-Policy (“Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a hands-off
approach when asked to review the political branches’ immigration decisions and
policymaking. The ability of Congress and the executive branch to regulate immigration
largely without judicial intervention is what has come to be known as the political branches’
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away” at this doctrine, and some have posited that Morales-Santana supports
“a greater willingness by the [C]ourt to apply . . . constitutional rules and
heightened scrutiny to immigration laws enacted by Congress.”14 Others
have criticized the Supreme Court’s decision to abrogate § 1409(c)’s oneyear exception for unwed mothers, and apply the harsher five-year physicalpresence requirement equally to unwed fathers and mothers.15 These
commentators contend that Morales-Santana’s result does not comport with
the Court’s established practice of remedying an equal protection violation
by extending the particular benefit rather than nullifying it.16
This Comment will examine the intersection of Congress’s plenary
power and the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in light of
Morales-Santana. Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of the
plenary power doctrine and briefly summarize Supreme Court rulings
relevant to the doctrine. Part III will analyze the Supreme Court’s genderbased equal protection jurisprudence, with a particular focus on the Court’s
longstanding practice of remedying equal protection violations by extending
the benefit. Part IV will provide a detailed discussion of the MoralesSantana decision. Part V will argue that the Court’s remedy in MoralesSantana was improper, and that the Court should have extended, rather than
eliminated, the benefit to remedy the constitutional infirmity. Further, while
Congress’s plenary power has recently yielded to constitutional principles,
Morales-Santana’s choice of remedy signals an indisputable “chipping
away” at Congress’s plenary power over immigration policies. Part VI will
‘plenary power’ over immigration.”).
14
Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Immigration Discrimination? SCOTUS Says No,
BNA (June 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/immigration-discrimination-scotusn73014453468/; see also Collins, supra note 10, at 175 (“By quietly rejecting the contention
that federal judges should defer to Congress when it regulates parent-child citizenship
transmission along constitutionally suspect lines, Morales-Santana constrains an operative
understanding of the plenary power doctrine and calls into question a core principle that
purportedly undergirds it: that sovereignty necessarily implies a limitation of judicial
authority. Morales-Santana does not repudiate the plenary power doctrine, but it contains it
and raises important questions concerning the doctrine’s future reach.”).
15
See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Ginsburg and the Price of Equality, N.Y. TIMES (June
22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/opinion/ruth-bader-ginsburg-supremecourt.html; David Issacson, Sessions v. Morales Santana: The Problems of Leveling Down,
INSIGHTFUL IMMIGR. BLOG (June 21, 2017), http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2017/06/sessions-vmorales-santana-the-problems-of-leveling-down.html; Ian Samuel, Morales-Santana and the
“Mean Remedy”, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 12, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/moralessantana-and-the-mean-remedy.
16
See Greenhouse, supra note 15; Issacson, supra note 15; Samuel, supra note 15. But
see Tracy A. Thomas, Leveling Down Gender Equality, 42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 2 (2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3157987&download=yes (explaining
that the Court’s “‘leveling down’ of the remedy—responding to inequality by reducing
benefits to all rather than leveling up and extending benefits to the disadvantaged group—is
unusual, but not unheard of”).
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conclude.
II. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
After Morales-Santana, the boundaries and vigor of the plenary power
doctrine remain uncertain; however, the doctrine’s origins and early
Supreme Court precedent demonstrate historical support for broad
congressional power over immigration matters. For more than a century, the
Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s “absolute and unqualified”
power—plenary power—over immigration, and has accordingly limited its
judicial review of immigration policies.17 This practice, in turn, has resulted
in diluted constitutional analysis in matters involving immigration law,18
with the Court “declar[ing] itself powerless to review even those
immigration provisions that explicitly classify on such disfavored bases as
race, gender, and legitimacy.”19 This Part begins with an analysis of the
origins of Congress’s plenary power over immigration, followed by a
discussion of the development of the doctrine, particularly in the context of
gender-based equal protection challenges, through a case-by-case analysis.
A. The Doctrine’s Origins
The United States Constitution does not explicitly grant the power to
regulate immigration to a specific branch of government. Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution invests the power “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization” in Congress.20 On its face, this provision does not grant
Congress absolute power over immigration. Still, Congress’s plenary power
is firmly rooted in Supreme Court precedent as evidenced by recurrent
affirmations that immigration matters21 “are so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial
17

See Feere, supra note 13; see also Jessica Portmess, Comment, Until the Plenary
Power Do Us Part: Judicial Scrutiny of the Defense of Marriage Act in Immigration After
Flores-Villar, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1825, 1829 (2012); Developments in the Law—Immigrant
Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1584 (2013) (“The plenary
power acts as a ‘shield’ against what could otherwise be meritorious individual rights claims
sounding in the equal protection and substantive due process components of the Fifth
Amendment.”).
18
Generally, “the term ‘immigration law’ [is] used to describe the body of law governing
the admission and the expulsion of aliens.” Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256 (1984) [hereinafter
Legomsky, Principle of Plenary Congressional Power]. This term is used accordingly in this
Comment’s discussion of the plenary power doctrine.
19
Id. at 255.
20
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
21
Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 381
(2004) (explaining that the plenary power doctrine is not all-encompassing and instead “most
clearly protects the political branches of the federal government in their exercise of power to
exclude and expel aliens”) (emphasis added).
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inquiry or interference.”22 The plenary power doctrine may be characterized
as a “doctrine of judicial deference” or, relatedly, a doctrine of “unlimited
congressional power.”23 But regardless of its characterization, the Court has
invoked the doctrine to rebuff constitutional challenges to immigration laws,
choosing instead to engage in only a minimal review of such laws when their
constitutionality is at issue.24 This judicial hesitancy to engage in
constitutional analysis has provided a “virtual blank check” to Congress to
formulate immigration laws as it sees fit and an ensuing judicial deference
to such judgment.25
The Court first gave life to Congress’s plenary power in its 1889
Chinese Exclusion Case.26 An Act of Congress prohibited Chinese laborers
from reentering the United States if they had departed before the passage of
the Act.27 A Chinese laborer who had received a certificate of return, but
who was then denied the right to reenter, challenged the validity of the Act.28
Rejecting his contentions, the Court held that determinations by Congress
regarding the admission of aliens were “conclusive upon the judiciary”—
thereby crafting Congress’s plenary power over immigration matters.29
After the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court continued to elaborate on and
develop Congress’s plenary power. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,30 the
Court extended the ruling in the Chinese Exclusion Case, declaring that
Congress also had exclusive and plenary power over the expulsion of aliens
from the United States.31 Notably, the Court in Fong Yue Ting
22

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
Cox, supra note 21, at 381–86 (discussing the overlapping characterizations of the
plenary power doctrine, including a characterization of the doctrine as one of “alien
standing”). Interpreting the doctrine as one of judicial deference means that courts “are
generally not the appropriate institution to evaluate [constitutional] constraints” on
Congress’s power to regulate immigration. Id. at 382. Separate but analogous, interpreting
the doctrine as one of unlimited congressional power means that “Congress’s power over
immigration is simply unlimited by any constitutional constraints.” Id. at 384.
24
Id. at 382.
25
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1617 (2000) [hereinafter Legomsky,
Immigration and Judicial Review].
26
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
27
Id. at 582.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 606. The Court justified its decision and found support for the plenary power
doctrine in a principle of inherent national sovereignty, reasoning that the federal
government’s ability, through Congress, to “exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition
[not] open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of
every independent nation.” Id. at 603.
30
149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (justifying the “right of a nation to expel or deport
foreigners” as inherent to national sovereignty, similar to the justification provided in the
Chinese Exclusion Case).
31
See id.
23
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acknowledged a procedural due process exception to the plenary power
doctrine solely for foreign nationals within the United States;32 however, the
Court later emphasized that the doctrine continued to prevent judicial review
of substantive due process challenges.33
The Court strengthened and reaffirmed Congress’s absolute power over
immigration in a series of cases in the 1950s, endorsing its nearly nonexistent
review of the constitutionality of immigration policies.34 In Knauff v.
Shaughnessy,35 the Court upheld the exclusion of the alien wife of a U.S.
citizen with broad deference to Congress’s decision and method of
exclusion.36 The Court reasoned that, “[w]hatever the rule may be
concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry into the United
States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized
by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government
to exclude a given alien.”37 Similarly, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei,38 the Court sustained an alien’s exclusion on Ellis Island,
reasoning that the “right to enter the United States depends on the
congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the
legislative mandate.”39
Thereafter, the Court invoked the plenary power doctrine to uphold the
removal of members of the Communist Party,40 and to reject a Marxist
scholar’s First Amendment challenge to his exclusion from the United
States.41 But intricate and novel challenges to immigration policies required
the Court to acknowledge, and to attempt to reconcile, the tension between

32
See id. at 701, 728 (explaining that foreign nationals within the United States were
afforded some procedural due process protections, but that such protections did not extend to
foreign nationals seeking entry); see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (explaining that such protections did not extend to aliens “on the
threshold of initial entry”).
33
See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 102 (1903); see also Portmess, supra note 17, at
1833–34 (discussing the Court’s acknowledgment of a procedural due process exception to
the plenary power).
34
See generally Mezei, 345 U.S. at 206; Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
35
338 U.S. 537 (1950).
36
Id. at 542, 547 (relying on the justification raised in the Chinese Exclusion Case and
Fong Yue Ting that “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty,” and
extending the plenary power and, accordingly, judicial deference to executive officer
determinations enforcing Congress’s rules of admissibility).
37
Id. at 543.
38
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
39
Id. at 216.
40
See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (affirming that entrusting the
formulation of immigration policies exclusively to Congress “has become about as firmly
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
government”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
41
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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substantive constitutional safeguards and the plenary power doctrine, which
historically justified the Court’s decision to “decline[] to review federal
immigration statutes for compliance with substantive constitutional
restraints.”42 Accordingly, the Court gradually established “unusual
standards” for reviewing substantive constitutional challenges to
immigration policies.43
B. The Supreme Court’s Modern Approach to the Plenary Power
Doctrine
Notwithstanding the fortitude of Congress’s plenary power, the
Supreme Court gradually moved away from its traditional, absolute “handsoff” approach to immigration matters.44 In so doing, the Court developed a
judicial role in assessing the constitutionality of immigration laws,
particularly in areas that did not directly involve deportation or exclusion.45
The evolution of this judicial role, however, has produced uncertainties
surrounding the status of the plenary power doctrine.46 While the Court has
invoked Congress’s plenary power in a range of recent immigration cases,47
the Court has applied varying levels of scrutiny in analyzing the alleged
constitutional infirmities, and has avoided defining the contours of the
doctrine, leaving future courts without a clear rule to follow.48
1. Fiallo v. Bell
In Fiallo v. Bell,49 the Supreme Court addressed an equal protection
challenge to § 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2)50 of the INA. The provisions gave
special preference immigration status to aliens who were the children of
U.S.-citizen (or lawful-permanent resident) mothers, and to aliens who were

42

See Legomsky, Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 18, at 255.
Portmess, supra note 17, at 1838–39.
44
See Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1585 (2013) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (“[C]ourts have
reviewed immigration laws, but have subjected them to only the most deferential standard—
rational basis review.”); Portmess, supra note 17, at 1838–39.
45
Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress,
and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 926 n.7 (1994) [hereinafter Legomsky, Ten
More Years of Plenary Power].
46
Compare Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
339 (2002) (arguing that the Court’s recent immigration decisions indicate the end of the
plenary power doctrine), with Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS:
A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835 (2002) (arguing that the plenary
power doctrine still influences the Court’s decisions, albeit not explicitly).
47
See infra pp. 9–17.
48
See Developments in the Law, supra note 44, at 1588–89.
49
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
50
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1)(D), 1101(b)(2) (1952); see also Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788.
43
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unwed mothers of U.S.-citizen (or lawful-permanent resident) children.51
Unwed fathers and their nonmarital children challenged the constitutionality
of the provisions after being denied special immigration preference.52 The
fathers and children contended that the provisions violated the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by discriminating against unwed
fathers and their nonmarital children “on the basis of the father’s marital
status, the illegitimacy of the child[,] and the sex of the parent without . . .
compelling or rational justification.”53 In other words, the gender
demarcation in the provisions made it unjustifiably more difficult for
nonmarital children and their natural fathers to attain special preference
immigration, as compared with nonmarital children and their natural
mothers.
At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court underscored the
“limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation” and, thus,
rejected a more searching standard of review.54 In holding the statutory
provisions constitutional under a rational basis review, the Court explained
that, although Congress’s distinction between nonmarital children of unwed
fathers and those of unwed mothers potentially “den[ied] preferential status
to parents and children who share[d] strong family ties,” it was beyond the
scope of the judicial role to examine the justifications for Congress’s
legislative decision.55 Invoking Congress’s broad plenary power over

51

Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788. The INA requires, among other conditions, that an alien
seeking admission into the United States as a legal permanent resident satisfy a numerical
quota and certain labor certification requirements. Id. at 789–90. Congress, however, allowed
American citizens to petition for waiver of the requirements for their immediate families. Id
at 800–01. The respective provisions of the Act
grant[ed] special preference immigration status to aliens who qualif[ied]
as the “children” or “parents” of United States citizens or lawful
permanent residents. Under § 101(b)(1), a “child” [wa]s defined as an
unmarried person under 21 years of age who [wa]s a legitimate or
legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child
seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural mother.
The definition d[id] not extend to an illegitimate child seeking preference
by virtue of his relationship with his natural father. Moreover, under §
101(b)(2), a person qualifie[d] as a “parent” . . . solely on the basis of the
person’s relationship with a “child.” As a result, the natural father of an
illegitimate child who is either a United States citizen or permanent
resident alien is not entitled to preferential treatment as a “parent.”
Id. at 788–89 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
52
Id. at 790.
53
Id. at 791.
54
Id. at 792 (explaining that Supreme Court precedent “ha[s] long recognized the power
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s
political departments largely immune from judicial control” and rejecting plaintiff-appellant’s
argument that such broad power did not apply in this case (citations omitted)).
55
Id. at 798–99 (citations omitted).
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immigration matters, the Court added that it did not have authority to
overrule Congress’s political judgment.56
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan,
agreed with the majority’s willingness to review the immigration statute at
issue; however, he disagreed with its “toothless” review.57 The dissenters
reasoned that the provisions at issue involved the rights of citizens rather
than aliens, and “discrimination among citizens cannot escape traditional
constitutional scrutiny simply because it occurs in the context of immigration
legislation.”58 Accordingly, the dissenters found the majority’s undue
deference to Congress inappropriate and would have applied a heightened
standard of review.59
2. Miller v. Albright
The Court’s strong deference to Congress’s plenary power over
immigration matters was further substantiated in Miller v. Albright,60 in
which a U.S.-citizen father and his foreign-born daughter challenged the
constitutionality of the gender distinction present in § 1409(a) of the INA.61
The provision delineates the requirements for transmission of U.S.
citizenship to a child born out of wedlock in a foreign country, and it draws
a distinction between the child of a U.S.-citizen mother and the child of a
U.S.-citizen father.62 More specifically, the provision provides that, subject
to residence requirements for the citizen parent,63 a child born abroad to an
unwed citizen mother acquires U.S. citizenship at birth, whereas a child born
abroad to an unwed citizen father acquires citizenship only once certain
legitimation requirements are satisfied.64
56
Id. at 799. Congress’s decision to withhold preferential statute from nonmarital
children and their fathers “nonetheless remains one solely for the responsibility of the
Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.” Id.
57
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 805.
58
Id. at 806, 809.
59
Id. at 810.
60
523 U.S. 420 (1998).
61
Codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2018). Petitioner did not challenge the
gender distinction prevalent in §§ 1409(c) and 1409(g)’s residency requirement as Petitioner’s
father satisfied the residency requirement. Miller, 523 U.S. at 430.
62
See § 1409(a).
63
These residency requirements are delineated in §§ 1409(c) and 1409(g), and are
challenged in Morales-Santana.
64
Miller, 523 U.S. at 430–31. Section 1409(a) imposes four requirements that unmarried
U.S.-citizen fathers must satisfy to confer citizenship on a child born out of wedlock to an
alien mother in another country. Citizenship is established if:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established
by clear and convincing evidence;
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the
person’s birth;

DE SOUSA (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

6/17/2019 6:45 PM

COMMENT

1133

Luz Penero was born out of wedlock in the Philippines to a U.S.-citizen
father and a Filipino mother.65 She sought U.S. citizenship after turning
eighteen, but the Government denied her application because her father
failed to legitimate her before her eighteenth birthday.66 Upon denial of her
application, Penero and her father filed suit alleging that the legitimation
requirements imposed on unwed fathers, but not on unwed mothers, were the
“product[s] of overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and
women,” and thus, violated the Equal Protection Clause.67
In rejecting the equal protection challenge,68 the Court determined that
the legitimation requirement imposed solely on unwed fathers served three
important purposes: (1) “ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship
between the potential citizen and [the] citizen parent”; (2) “encouraging the
development of a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the
child while the child is a minor”; and (3) “fostering ties between the foreignborn child and the United States.”69 The Court reasoned that the biological
differences between unwed fathers and unwed mothers “provide a relevant
basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial
support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years; and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years—
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence
or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court.
Only the second of these four requirements is expressly included in §
1409(c), the provision applicable to unwed citizen mothers.
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
65
Miller, 523 U.S. at 425.
66
Id. at 424–25. In addition to the disparate duration of residency requirement imposed
on mothers and fathers, § 1409 also requires that a U.S.-citizen father, but not a U.S.-citizen
mother, take “one of three affirmative steps” before the child attains the age of eighteen to
confer U.S. citizenship on his nonmarital child: “legitimation; a declaration of paternity under
oath by the father; or a court order of paternity.” Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
It is this affirmative requirement that the daughter and her father challenged as the “father
satisfied the residency requirement” and thus, “the validity of the [gender] distinction in that
requirement . . . [wa]s not at issue.” Miller, 523 U.S. at 430.
67
Id. at 435 (internal quotations omitted).
68
Id. at 434 (internal citations omitted). “Deference to the political branches dictates ‘a
narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress . . . in the area of immigration
and naturalization.’” Id. at 434 n.11. The Court added that “[e]ven if . . . the heightened
scrutiny that normally governs gender discrimination claims applied in this context, [it was]
persuaded that the [legitimation] requirement imposed . . . on children of unmarried male, but
not female, citizens is substantially related to important governmental objectives.” Id. at 431,
434 n.11 (citations omitted).
69
Id. at 436, 438.
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children born in foreign lands.”70 In turn, these differences underpinned §
1409(a)’s gender demarcation,71 which the Court concluded was well
tailored to serve the Government’s interests.72 The Court, however, did not
produce a majority opinion and the constitutionality of § 1409(a) remained
an open question.73
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that § 1409(a) should
be upheld, but on different grounds. The Justices maintained that the Court
did not have the authority to review the constitutionality of the statute and to
provide the relief requested because only Congress has the power to
prescribe the requirements for conferral of citizenship on persons not born
within the United States.74 The plain language of § 1409 sets forth a
precondition that Congress deemed appropriate to the acquisition of
citizenship, no matter that it encompasses a gender distinction. Accordingly,
the Justices added that “even if the Court were to agree that the difference in
treatment between the illegitimate children of citizen-fathers and citizenmothers is unconstitutional, it could not, consistent with the extremely
limited judicial power in this area, remedy that constitutional infirmity.”75
More specifically, the Justices posited that the Court could not extend or
70

Id. at 422.
Miller, 523 U.S. at 445. The Court reasoned that whereas there is no time-sensitive
legitimation requirement for unwed mothers, “the argument overlooks the difference between
a substantive condition and a procedural limitation.” Id. at 435. More specifically, “the blood
relationship to the birth mother” is established at the time of birth—the substantive conduct
that qualifies her child for citizenship. Id. at 436. In contrast, such a relationship to the father
is not so immediate and, thus Congress imposed an eighteen-year requirement within which
an unwed father must demonstrate such a relationship in order to transmit citizenship. Id.
The Court emphasized that there was “no procedural hurdle that limit[ed] the time or the
method by which either parent (or the child) [could] provide . . . evidence that the necessary
steps were taken to transmit citizenship to the child.” Id. at 435. Accordingly, the requirement
did not impose a burden on unwed fathers. Id. at 436.
72
Id.
73
Four Justices, in two different opinions, rejected the challenge to the gender-based
distinction. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Rehnquist, found the statute consistent with the
Fifth Amendment, while Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that the Court
could not provide a remedy even if the statute violated equal protection. Id. at 423, 452.
Conversely, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, would have found
the statute unconstitutional as violating the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 460. Finally,
Justice O’Conner and Justice Kennedy would have dismissed on standing grounds, reasoning
that the child lacked standing to raise an equal protection challenge on behalf of his father.
Id. at 445.
74
Id. at 453, 456 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“An alien who seeks political rights as a
member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified
by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications.”) (emphasis
in original).
75
Id. at 423, 456 (internal citations omitted) (“Because only Congress has the power to
set the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by persons not born within the territory of
the United States, federal courts cannot exercise that power under the guise of their remedial
authority.”).
71
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eliminate the benefits conferred by § 1409(a) because doing so would require
the Court “to speculate as to what Congress would have enacted if it had not
enacted what it did,” and that is incompatible with Congress’s plenary power
over immigration.76
3. Nguyen v. I.N.S.
After Fiallo and Miller, the Court appeared to signal a shift in its broad
deference to Congress’s plenary power, subjecting certain statutes to a more
stringent constitutional analysis. In Nguyen v. I.N.S.,77 the Court accepted a
second opportunity to assess the constitutionality of § 1409(a) of the INA.78
Tuan Anh Nguyen and his father challenged the constitutionality of §
1409(a) after the government denied Nguyen’s claim for derivative U.S.
citizenship.79 Nguyen was born in Vietnam to a U.S.-citizen father and a
Vietnamese mother, but moved to the U.S. at the age of six where he
remained as a lawful permanent resident.80 In 1995, the government initiated
deportation proceedings against Nguyen and ultimately ordered his
deportation, as his father had failed to take the affirmative steps necessary
for Nguyen to obtain citizenship under § 1409(a).81 Nguyen and his father
contended that the provision violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee by unjustifiably imposing different requirements for
acquisition of U.S. citizenship by children born abroad to a U.S.-citizen
father.82
Applying “equal protection scrutiny,”83 the Court rejected the challenge
and held that the disparate treatment of mothers and fathers under § 1409(a)
did not violate the equal protection guarantee.84 The Court relied largely on
the governmental objectives and biological differences emphasized in Miller
76
Id. at 457, 459 (“We are dealing here with an exercise of the Nation’s sovereign power
to admit or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived national interests. Federal judges
may not decide what those national interests are, and what requirements for citizenship best
serve them.”).
77
533 U.S. 53 (2001).
78
See supra note 2.
79
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 57–58. In addition to the disparate duration of residency requirement imposed
on mother and fathers, § 1409 also requires that a U.S.-citizen father, but not a U.S.-citizen
mother, take “one of three affirmative steps” before the child attains the age of eighteen to
confer U.S. citizenship on his nonmarital child: “legitimation; a declaration of paternity under
oath by the father; or a court order of paternity.” Id. at 62. It is this affirmative requirement
that Nguyen and his father challenged. Id. at 57–58.
82
Id. at 58.
83
Id. at 60–61. The Court assumed, without deciding, that intermediate scrutiny applied
given the gender-based classifications at issue, refusing to consider whether a lesser degree
of scrutiny could apply in light of Congress’s plenary power. Id.
84
Id. at 58–59.
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in support of the constitutionality of § 1409(a),85 and similarly concluded
that “Congress ha[d] not erected inordinate and unnecessary hurdles to the
conferral of citizenship on the children of citizen fathers in furthering its
important objectives.”86 Notably, however, the Court refused to identify the
standard of review applicable in immigration cases involving constitutional
questions, particularly in light of Congress’s plenary power. The Court
reasoned that, because the statute satisfied heightened scrutiny, the Court did
not need to “decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains.”87
In dicta, the Court noted that, if the provision had not survived
heightened scrutiny, Nguyen and his father would not necessarily prevail, as
the Court would likely face difficulties in fashioning a remedy.88 More
specifically, remedying the constitutional violation would require the Court
to sever the provision, which would problematically confer “citizenship on
terms other than those specified by Congress.”89 Still, the Court avoided
resolving this issue given the constitutionality of the provision. Justice
O’Connor, in a dissenting opinion, critiqued the Court’s application of the
heightened scrutiny standard, concluding that the gender classification did
not substantially relate to the alleged governmental interests.90
4. United States v. Flores-Villar
After Nguyen, it was unclear just how deferential the Court remained
to Congress’s policy decisions regarding immigration matters. In its most
recent treatment of Congress’s plenary power prior to its decision in
Morales-Santana, the Court tangentially addressed the constitutionality of
§§ 1401 and 140991 in United States v. Flores-Villar.92 Ruben Flores-Villar,
85

Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62–68.
Id. at 70–71. The Court explained that “[i]n the case of a citizen mother and a child
born overseas, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child
inheres in the very event of birth.” Id. at 65. Accordingly, the gender demarcation considered
“a biological difference” between fathers and mothers and thus, it was a lawful and “sensible
statutory scheme, given the unique relationship of the mother to the event of birth.” Id. at 64.
87
Id. at 61.
88
Id. at 72.
89
Id. at 71–72. The Court highlighted the required deference to Congress’s intent by
noting that
Congress expressly provided with respect to the very subchapter of the
United States Code at issue and in a provision entitled “Sole procedure”
that “[a] person may only be naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter and
not otherwise.”
Id. at 72; see also infra Part IV for a discussion of Morales-Santana, where the Court
ultimately considers and decides this issue.
90
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74–97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
91
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
92
536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an equally divided court per curiam 564 U.S.
86
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a Mexican-native born to a U.S.-citizen father and a Mexican mother,
claimed U.S. citizenship as derived from his father as a defense to
deportation proceedings.93 Upon denial of his claim, Flores-Villar
challenged the constitutionality of §§ 1401 and 1409, arguing that the
provisions classified and discriminated on the basis of gender and age.94
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ostensibly applying
intermediate scrutiny, upheld the constitutionality of §§ 1401 and 1409. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the provisions could survive an equal protection
challenge “under intermediate scrutiny, a rational basis standard, or some
other level of review in between,” but like the Supreme Court in Nguyen, the
court assumed that intermediate scrutiny applied.95 The court reasoned that,
while the means at issue in Nguyen—legitimation requirement for fathers—
were different from the means at issue in Flores-Villar—longer residency
requirement for fathers—the “government’s interests [we]re no less
important, and the particular means no less substantially related to those
objectives,” particularly “in light of the virtually plenary power that
Congress has to legislate in the area of immigration and citizenship.”96
Still, the Ninth Circuit refused to decide which level of constitutional
scrutiny is most appropriate in immigration cases, leaving it an open
question.97 The Supreme Court affirmed Flores-Villar “by an equally
divided Court” without issuing an opinion.98 Because “an affirmance by an
equally divided Court [is not] entitled to precedential weight,”99 FloresVillar did not elucidate the Court’s position on the plenary power doctrine
or the standard of review that should be applied in such cases.100
After Flores-Villar, commentators highlighted the Court’s hesitancy to
issue a clear opinion on the plenary power doctrine’s modern boundaries.
Some interpreted the Court’s affirmance in Flores-Villar, among its other
decisions, as a “refus[al] to clarify the standard of scrutiny that applies in
challenges to immigration statutes,” which leaves the viability of the plenary
210 (2011), abrogated by Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
93
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994.
94
Id. at 994–95.
95
Id. at 996 n.2.
96
Id. at 996–97 (internal citation omitted). As in Nguyen, the Government in FloresVillar asserted that the gender demarcation substantially furthered certain governmental
interests; namely (1) the assurance “that a biological parent-child relationship exists” and (2)
avoiding statelessness of children by ensuring a connection to the United States. Id. at 995–
96. In both instances, the Government argued that mothers and fathers are situated differently
as the parent-child relationship is easily established at birth for the mother but not for the
father. Id.
97
Id. at 996 n.2.
98
Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210, 210 (2011) (per curiam).
99
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
100
See Developments in the Law, supra note 44, at 1591.
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power doctrine uncertain.101 Others argued that the Court’s failure to
explicitly invoke the doctrine in its recent decisions, thereby engaging in a
form of constitutional analysis, signals that “the grave has been dug” for
Congress’s plenary power.102 In light of the diluted scrutiny applied by the
Court in its recent immigration cases, however, it is evident that the plenary
power continues to influence the Court’s decisions, even if the Court does
not invoke it explicitly.103 The Court ultimately tackled this issue in
Morales-Santana, albeit in a manner that arguably departed from its
traditional approach to the plenary power doctrine.104
III. GENDER-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that no
State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”105 This prohibition extends to the federal government through the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.106 While the Equal Protection
Clause does not prevent the states and the federal government from treating
different classes of persons differently,107 it prohibits, among other things,
gender classifications that rest on stereotypical notions about the relative
roles and abilities of each gender.108 This Part examines the history of the
Equal Protection Clause as it applies to gender classifications in federal
legislation, with a particular focus on the Supreme Court’s practice of
extending, rather than nullifying, a benefit to redress an equal protection

101

See Portmess, supra note 17, at 1829.
See Spiro, supra note 46, at 340.
103
See Pillard, supra note 46, at 836, 846–47 (arguing that the Court has merely driven
the doctrine “underground”).
104
See infra Part IV; see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452–59 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
105
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
106
See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (“The Fifth
Amendment . . . does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment[,] which applies only to the states,” but “it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”).
107
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause directs that
‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’” “[T]he Constitution does not
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were
the same.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways.”).
108
See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1696–97 (2017); Califano v.
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (explaining that the gender demarcations in a provision of
the Social Security Act were “part of the ‘baggage of sexual stereotypes’” that the father’s
primary responsibility is breadwinning, while the mother’s is hearthtending, and that
“[l]egislation that rests on such presumptions, without more,” could not survive equal
protection scrutiny).
102
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violation.109
A. A Brief History of Equal Protection and Gender-Based
Classifications
Courts have generally regarded federal legislation that differentiates on
the basis of gender as presumptively invalid “because gender generally
provides no sensible ground for differential treatment.”110 Accordingly,
courts addressing an equal protection challenge to a gender-based
classification typically apply intermediate scrutiny.111 Notably, however, the
level of scrutiny applied to such classifications has changed considerably
over the past several years.112 Until the early 1970s, gender-based
classifications were subjected only to rational basis review—the lowest level
of judicial scrutiny.113 But the Court changed course in Reed v. Reed.114 In
its first decision invalidating a gender-based classification as
unconstitutional, the Court recognized that gender-based discrimination
should be subjected to a more stringent scrutiny than rational basis.115 Still,
the Court stopped short of explicitly adopting a heightened standard of
109

Extending the benefit is often colloquially referred to as “leveling up,” and nullifying
the benefit is colloquially referred to as “leveling down.” See Deborah L. Brake, When
Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2004) (“[I]nequality may be remedied either by leveling up
and improving the treatment of the disadvantaged class, or by leveling down and bringing the
group that is better off down to the level of those worse off.” (footnote omitted))
110
Rachel L. Jensen et al., Equal Protection, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 213, 230 (2000).
111
Id. Intermediate (or heightened) scrutiny is a standard of constitutional review used
by courts in equal protection cases. See Justin Hess, Nonimmigrants, Equal Protection, and
the Supremacy Clause, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2277, 2280–81 (2010). Specifically, intermediate
scrutiny is used to determine whether gender classifications in legislation are constitutional.
“[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are ‘subject to scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause[]’” and “[t]o withstand constitutional challenge . . .
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). Further, if a statute does not implicate a fundamental right or does not affect certain
protected classes, a court may apply a more deferential standard of review known as rational
basis review. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938); see
also infra note 112 and accompanying text. Immigration provisions that involve gender
classifications have been reviewed under rational basis rather than intermediate scrutiny. See
generally Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
112
See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873);
see also Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny
to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 953 (1996).
113
Brake, supra note 112. Under rational basis review, a classification survives
constitutional scrutiny if it is “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Id.
“Courts have only rarely struck down government classifications under rational basis review.”
Id.
114
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho statute that preferred males over females as
administrators of estates).
115
Id. at 75–76.
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review.116
In Frontiero v. Richardson,117 a plurality of the Court expanded Reed
to conclude that gender-based classifications should be subjected to strict
scrutiny.118 The Court nevertheless retreated from this exacting standard of
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren119 and gave life to intermediate scrutiny.120 In
invalidating an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of beer to males
under twenty-one and to females under eighteen, a majority of the Court
found Reed controlling, and held that gender-based classifications should be
subjected to intermediate scrutiny.121 The Court identified the standard for
this level of scrutiny that courts still use with precision today: “To withstand
constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.”122 Finally, the Court refined (and arguably intensified)
this standard of scrutiny in subsequent gender-discrimination cases.123 The
Court provided that, apart from the standard articulated in Craig, a
challenged gender-based classification will be upheld only if there is an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification.124
As previously discussed, this heightened standard of scrutiny has not
held constant in cases involving immigration statutes that discriminate on the
basis of gender.125 In such cases, the Court has indisputably considered
Congress’s plenary power over immigration, and has modified its
intermediate scrutiny to one that is more deferential—arguably akin to
rational basis review.126 In the words of one commentator, “[a]t the

116
Id. Although the Court did not formally adopt heightened scrutiny, it applied
something more stringent than rational basis review. Id. The Court provided that “[a]
classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”‘ Id. at 76.
117
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating a fringe benefits statute that automatically
considered spouses of servicemen dependents for purposes of obtaining benefits, but required
servicewomen to prove actual dependency by their spouses in order to obtain identical
benefits).
118
Id. at 688 (“[W]e can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like
classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”).
119
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
120
Id. at 197.
121
Id. at 197–98.
122
Id. at 197; see also Jensen et al., supra note 110, at 232–33.
123
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981);
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); see also Brake, supra note 112,
at 956.
124
Id.; see also Jensen et al., supra note 110, at 238; Brake, supra note 112, at 956.
125
See supra Part II.B.
126
See supra Part II.B.
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intersection of immigration and equal protection lies a judicial vortex. This
area of law is a twilight zone of sorts, where established constitutional
principles do not follow their regular paths.”127
B. Supreme Court’s Practice of Extending the Benefit to Remedy
Gender Discrimination
Once the Supreme Court ascertains that a federal statute128 violates the
Equal Protection Clause, it must determine how to redress the constitutional
infirmity. The appropriate remedy is generally a mandate of equal
treatment,129 but “[h]ow equality is accomplished . . . is a matter on which
the Constitution is silent.”130 The Supreme Court must provide a
constitutionally sufficient remedy and thereby “serve as a short-term
surrogate for the legislature.”131 The Court generally fulfills this role by
assessing whether the unconstitutionally discriminatory benefit should be
extended or nullified.132 Traditionally, the Court has chosen “extension,
rather than nullification” as the proper course,133 and until Sessions v.
Morales-Santana, the Court had never ordered nullification of a benefit to
redress an equal protection violation.134 In view of this, nowhere is the
127

Hess, supra note 111, at 2277.
See Sabina Mariella, Note, Leveling up Over Plenary Power: Remedying an
Impermissible Gender Classification in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 96 B.U. L. REV.
219, 232 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court seeks redress when a federal statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause; however, when the Court considers “state action or
legislation . . . [it] has often avoided the question by remanding the remedial decision to state
courts” due to federalism concerns).
129
See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984).
130
Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 426–27 (2010) (citing Mathews, 465
U.S. at 740).
131
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair
Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 317 (1979); see also Bruce K. Miller,
Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Approach of Heckler v.
Mathews, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 131 (1985).
132
See Mathews, 465 U.S. at 738 (“[A] court . . . faces ‘two remedial alternatives: [it]
may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that
the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those
who are aggrieved by the exclusion.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also Brake, supra note
109, at 515 (“In the canon of equal protection, it is seemingly well-settled that inequality may
be remedied either by leveling up and improving the treatment of the disadvantaged class, or
by leveling down and bringing the group that is better off down to the level of those worse
off.”).
133
See, e.g., Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739 n.5. While the Supreme Court has never directly
addressed its preference for leveling up, some scholars contend that a potential reason for the
avoidance of leveling down is that it could “confront[] persons disadvantaged by inequality
with a double bind: challenge the inequality and risk worsening the situation for others instead
of improving one’s own situation, or continue to endure unlawful discrimination.” Brake,
supra note 109, at 516.
134
See Miller, supra note 131, at 142.
128
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Court’s practice of extending the benefit more evident than in its equal
protection jurisprudence involving gender classifications.
1. Frontiero v. Richardson
In Frontiero v. Richardson,135 the Court considered a constitutional
challenge to a statutory scheme136 that provided increased fringe benefits to
members of the uniformed services who had dependents. The statutes
entitled the servicemembers “to an increased ‘basic allowence [sic] for
quarters’ and . . . [the] member’s dependents [to] comprehensive medical
and dental care.”137 The statute provided that a serviceman could claim his
wife as a dependent irrespective of whether she depended on him for support;
however, a servicewoman could not claim her husband as a dependent unless
he was “in fact dependent upon her for over one-half of his support.”138
Sharron Frontiero, a female lieutenant of the United States Air Force, sought
increased benefits for her and her husband. Her application was ultimately
denied as a result of her failure to show that her husband in fact depended on
her for more than one-half of his support.139
Frontiero challenged the gender distinction, alleging that the statutory
scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it
unreasonably placed a proof-of-dependency burden on women that it did not
place on men.140 The Supreme Court, expanding on its decision in Reed v.
Reed,141 applied intermediate scrutiny in holding the statutes
Because the challenged statutes “command[ed]
unconstitutional.142
dissimilar treatment for men and women who [were] similarly situated,” the
Court sought evidence to support the differential treatment.143 The
government contended that the statutes’ gender distinction served
administrative efficiency; however, the Court found this justification,
without concrete evidence, insufficient to withstand heightened judicial
scrutiny.144 To redress the constitutional infirmity, the Court eliminated the
135

411 U.S. 677 (1973).
37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1962); 10 U.S.C §§ 1072, 1076 (1958).
137
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 679–80.
138
Id. at 678–79 (emphasis added).
139
Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
140
Id. at 680 & n.5, 690–91 (“[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.’”
(alteration in original)).
141
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
142
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688 (“[C]lassifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”).
143
Id. at 688.
144
Id. at 688–90 (“[A]lthough efficacious administration of governmental programs is
not without some importance, the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
136
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proof-of-dependency requirement imposed on women, thereby extending the
benefit accorded to men—namely, the lack of such a requirement—to
women.145
2. Califano v. Westcott
The Supreme Court’s practice of extending the particular benefit was
further institutionalized in Califano v. Westcott.146 The Court addressed a
constitutional challenge to § 407 of the Social Security Act,147 which granted
benefits to families whose dependent children were deprived of parental
support because of the father’s unemployment, but did not grant such
benefits to families who lacked support because of the mother’s
unemployment.148 Two couples applied for public assistance because the
wives—the former breadwinners in each respective family—and their
husbands were unemployed.149 The families were denied benefits on the
ground that the husbands’ prior work histories were insufficient to render
them “unemployed” under the Act, notwithstanding the fact that the wives
satisfied the unemployment criteria.150 The couples challenged the
provision’s gender distinction as repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.151
The district court declared § 407 unconstitutional, finding that the
gender differentiation was not “substantially related to the achievement of
any important governmental interests.”152 More specifically, the district
court found that the differentiation failed intermediate scrutiny because it
rested on an “archaic and overbroad generalization” that the loss of mothers’
earnings in two-parent families did not significantly affect families because

efficiency . . . . [A]ny statutory scheme [that] draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for
the purpose of achieving administrative convenience . . . involves the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
145
Id. at 690–91 n.25. The Court explained that its conclusion invalidated only the
portion of the statutory scheme that “require[s] a female member to prove the dependency of
her spouse.” Id.
146
443 U.S. 76 (1979).
147
Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1935).
148
Westcott, 443 U.S. at 78.
149
Id. at 80–81.
150
Id. at 80–81 n.1. To be eligible for benefits under § 407 of the Act, a family had to
meet both financial and categorical requirements. Id. The States determined the financial
requirements, while the Federal Government determined the categorical requirements. Id.
The Act itself delineated the requirements for satisfying the “unemployment” definition under
the Act that “w[ould] render a family eligible for . . . benefits.” Id. Most importantly, the
regulations spoke “in terms of the unemployment of the ‘father.’” Id.
151
Id. at 81. The families also challenged § 407 as violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
152
Id. at 81–82 (applying intermediate scrutiny standard for gender classifications).
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women were not traditional breadwinners.153 To remedy the constitutional
infirmity, the lower court ordered that benefits paid to families that are
deprived of parental support because of the father’s unemployment must also
be paid to families deprived of such support because of the mother’s
unemployment.154 Thus, the district court extended the benefit.
The Supreme Court agreed that the gender classification did not survive
constitutional scrutiny because it was “not substantially related to the
attainment of any important and valid statutory goals.”155 Rather, the Court
added, it rested on stereotypes that a “father has the primary responsibility
to provide . . . while the mother is the center of home and family life” and
legislation that finds its support in such presumptions without concrete
evidence cannot survive heightened judicial scrutiny.156 The Court,
therefore, affirmed the lower court’s decision to extend the benefit to
families of unemployed mothers, concluding that such a remedy was not only
consistent with its longstanding practice of extension, but was also supported
by “equitable considerations.”157
These cases demonstrate the Court’s longstanding practice of extending
the benefit—or “leveling up”—to remedy equal protection violations,
particularly when grappling with gender-based discrimination.
Notwithstanding this practice, the Morales-Santana Court took the
unprecedented step of remedying the relevant equal protection violation by
“leveling down,” namely by nullifying the one-year exception for unmarried
U.S.-citizen mothers—the benefit—and applying the longer, ten-year
residency requirement to all non-marital children irrespective of the U.S.citizen parent’s gender.158 This unique choice of remedy suggests that the
Court is not yielding to Congress’s plenary power over all immigration
matters. Instead, it intimates that the plenary power’s reach is limited,
particularly when equal protection principles are involved.

153

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Westcott, 443 U.S. at 82 (“The court saw two remedial alternatives: a simple injunction
against further operation of the . . . program, or extension of the program to all families with
needy children where either parent is unemployed. The court decided that extension, rather
than nullification, was the proper remedial course . . . .”).
155
Id. at 89.
156
Id. at 90.
157
Id. at 89–90 (“In previous cases involving equal protection challenges to
underinclusive federal benefits statutes, this Court has suggested that extension, rather than
nullification, is the proper course.” In weighing the proper choice here, the Court reasoned
that “[a]pproximately 300,000 needy children currently receive . . . benefits [under § 407],
and an injunction suspending the program’s operation would impose hardship on beneficiaries
whom Congress plainly meant to protect.”) (internal citations omitted).
158
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701 (2017).
154
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IV. SESSIONS V. MORALES-SANTANA159
Luis Ramón Morales-Santana was convicted of several offenses under
the New York Penal Law, which triggered removal proceedings by the
United States Government. To resist removal, Morales-Santana asserted
U.S. citizenship as derived from his father. When his application was
unsuccessful, Morales-Santana alleged an equal protection violation
resulting from a gender differentiation in applicable INA provisions. This
Part briefly addresses Morales-Santana’s background, followed by a
discussion of the Second Circuit’s resolution of the asserted equal protection
violation and the Supreme Court’s decision in Morales-Santana, focusing on
its approach to the equal protection violation.
A. Background
Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic in 1962 to a
U.S.-citizen father and a Dominican mother.160 His father, José Morales, left
his childhood home in Puerto Rico in 1919, twenty days before his
nineteenth birthday, to work in the Dominican Republic.161 Once there, he
met a Dominican woman named Yrma Santana Montilla.162 In 1962, Yrma
gave birth to their child, Morales-Santana, and the pair married in 1970.163
Morales-Santana subsequently moved to Puerto Rico in 1975 and then to
New York in 1976 as a lawful permanent resident.164
In 2000, Morales-Santana faced removal proceedings after receiving
various felony convictions.165 Morales-Santana applied for a stay of
removal, claiming he derived U.S. citizenship from his father’s U.S.
citizenship under § 1409.166 The Government, however, classified MoralesSantana as an alien because at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, his father
did not satisfy the physical-presence requirement applicable to unwed
fathers.167 Consequently, an immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s
citizenship claim and “ordered [his] removal to the Dominican Republic.”168
159

See generally id.
Id. at 1687–88.
161
Id. at 1687. Morales-Santana’s father acquired U.S. citizenship in 1917 pursuant to
the Jones Act. See Jones Act of Puerto Rico, Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
162
See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688.
163
Id. “Morales–Santana was . . . ‘legitimat[ed]’ by his father upon his parents’ marriage
in 1970 and admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1975.” See
Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (internal citations omitted).
164
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688.
165
Id.
166
See id.; see also Lynch, 804 F.3d at 524–25.
167
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688.
168
Id.
160
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In 2010, Morales-Santana sought to reopen his removal proceedings on
the basis of an equal protection violation.169 Morales-Santana challenged §§
1401 and 1409’s gender-based distinction in the treatment of derivative
citizenship conferral rights, alleging that the then-applicable ten-year170
residency requirement for unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, juxtaposed with the
one-year physical presence requirement for unwed U.S.-citizen mothers,
violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.171 The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Morales-Santana relief.172
B. The Second Circuit’s Remedy
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the BIA’s
decision, holding the gender-based differential in §§ 1401 and 1409
unconstitutional as violating the equal protection guarantee.173 The Second
Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny in reviewing the INA provisions
because the law “discriminate[d] on the basis of gender.”174 In rejecting the
government’s request to apply rational basis review, the court distinguished
Morales-Santana’s claim of pre-existing citizenship at birth with Fiallo’s175
claim of special preference for admission of non-citizens.176 The Court
reasoned that, while “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over the admission [or removal] of aliens,”
a claim of pre-existing citizenship is not an “issue of alienage that would
trigger special deference” to Congress.177 Accordingly, the court found that
Fiallo’s deferential standard did not govern and thus, the gender-based
scheme in §§ 1401 and 1409 must be “substantially related to an actual and
169

Id. Morales-Santana made three additional arguments in support of derivative
citizenship; however, those arguments are not addressed in this Comment because they are
not relevant to the alleged equal protection violation or Congress’s plenary power over
immigration matters. See Lynch, 804 F.3d at 525.
170
Morales-Santana necessarily challenged the ten-year requirement present in the 1952
Act applicable at the time of his birth and not the five-year requirement present in the current
version of the Act; however, both versions reflect a gender differentiation. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(7) (1958), with 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018). For purposes of clarity, this Comment
will refer to the duration of residency requirement as the “five-year requirement.”
171
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688–89 (“Because § 1409 treats sons and daughters
alike,” Morales-Santana alleged the gender-discrimination claim on behalf of his father “who
was unwed at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth and was not accorded the right an unwed
U.S.-citizen mother would have to transmit U.S. citizenship to her child.”).
172
Id. at 1688.
173
Lynch, 804 F.3d at 528, 538.
174
Id. at 528.
175
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
176
Lynch, 804 F.3d at 528 (emphasis added).
177
Id. (internal citations omitted). Congress exercises plenary power over immigration
matters; however, the Second Circuit emphasized that such power traditionally extends to
issues of admission and exclusion of non-citizens, but not to issues of pre-existing citizenship.
Id.; see also supra Part II.
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important governmental objective” in order to be upheld.178
The government articulated two objectives that would be furthered by
the provision’s gender-based physical-presence requirements: (1) ensuring a
sufficient connection between the child and the United States to warrant
citizenship, and (2) preventing newborn statelessness.179 The Second Circuit
did not find either interest persuasive, concluding that the gender-based
scheme was not substantially related to the purported interests and that §§
1401 and 1409 therefore violated equal protection.180 To cure the
constitutional infirmity, the Second Circuit mandated equal treatment by
severing the five-year181 requirement for unwed U.S.-citizen fathers and
“requiring every unwed citizen parent to satisfy the less onerous one-year
continuous presence requirement.”182 This remedy, in turn, confirmed
Morales-Santana’s U.S. citizenship at birth as derived from his father, who
readily satisfied the one-year residency requirement.183 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in 2016.184
C. The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Victory Without a Remedy
The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice Ginsburg,
affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment that the gender discrepancy in §§
1401 and 1409 violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
The Court, however, explicitly disagreed with the Second Circuit’s remedial
course, finding the extension of the one-year physical presence requirement
178
Lynch, 804 F.3d at 529 (“[C]itizen claimants with an equal protection claim deserving
of heightened scrutiny do not lose that favorable form of review simply because the case arises
in the context of immigration.”).
179
Id. at 530–35.
180
Id. at 531–35. The court found that both interests were important governmental
interests; however, they were insufficient to withstand intermediate scrutiny. Id. As for the
first interest, the court added that the government “offers no reason, and [the court] s[aw] no
reason, that unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers in the United States prior to
the child’s birth in order to assimilate values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to
citizen children born abroad.” Id. at 530. As to the second interest, the court found that
“avoidance of statelessness [was not] Congress’s actual purpose in establishing the physical
presence requirements” and even if it were, the interest could not survive intermediate
scrutiny because gender-neutral means were available to accomplish the objective. Id. at 531.
181
Recall that Morales-Santana necessarily challenged the ten-year requirement as it
existed in the 1952 Act at the time of his birth. See supra notes 6 and 170.
182
Lynch, 804 F.3d at 535–36 (internal citations omitted). To make this determination,
the Second Circuit looked to Congress’s intent in enacting the statutory scheme. Id. at 535–
37. Notwithstanding the government’s argument to sever the one-year exception for mothers
and extend the more onerous requirement to every unwed U.S.-citizen parent, the court found
that “the historical background against which Congress enacted the relevant provisions” and
“the binding precedent that cautions . . . to extend rather than contract benefits in the face of
ambiguous congressional intent” supported the chosen remedy. Id. at 536–37.
183
Id. at 538.
184
Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016).
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inappropriate.185 Justices Thomas and Alito, in a joint concurring opinion,
found that the majority decided too much. The Justices reasoned that,
because the Court did not have the power to provide relief—”namely,
conferral of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress”—
it did not need to address the constitutionality of the INA provisions.186
The majority nevertheless engaged in a unique constitutional analysis.
Justice Ginsburg began by positing that §§ 1401 and 1409 “date from an era
when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations
about the way men and women are,” with “[l]aws [that] grant[ed] or den[ied]
benefits on the basis of the sex of the qualifying parent.”187 The Court,
therefore, applied intermediate scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of the
gender-based classification inherent in the INA provisions.188 Justice
Ginsburg rejected the government’s contention that the Court should instead
apply a rational basis review in light of “Congress’[s] exceptionally broad
power to admit or exclude aliens.”189 Similar to the Second Circuit, Justice
Ginsburg found Fiallo190 distinguishable and its deferential standard
inapplicable, as it involved the admission of aliens, which implicates
Congress’s plenary power, whereas Morales-Santana involved a claim of
pre-existing citizenship, which arguably does not trigger such broad
power.191
The Court found the “discrete duration-of-residence requirements for
unwed mothers and fathers . . . stunningly anachronistic” as resting on the
obsolete notion that the unwed mother is “the child’s natural and sole
guardian” and that the father is “less qualified and entitled . . . to take
responsibility for nonmarital children.”192
Because “no important
185

Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1700–01 (2017).
Id. at 1701–02 (internal citations omitted).
187
Id. at 1683 (internal quotations omitted).
188
Id. at 1683–84, 1690 (“[H]eightened scrutiny is in order” and thus, “[s]uccessful
defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender . . . requires an ‘exceedingly
persuasive justification.’” Such justification must demonstrate that the classification
“serve[s] an important governmental interest today.”).
189
Id. at 1693 (internal quotations omitted).
190
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). The Court also distinguished Miller v. Albright,
523 U.S. 420 (1998) and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), in which the Supreme Court
applied a rational basis standard in reviewing a parental-acknowledgement provision of the
INA, because Morales-Santana involved a physical-presence requirement instead. Id. at
1694; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of The American Civil Liberties Union, The New York
Civil Liberties Union, The National Immigration Law Center, & The National Women’s Law
Center, in Support of Respondents at 7–8, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678
(2017) (No. 15-1191) (“[S]ince Fiallo was decided, this Court has made unequivocally clear,
in numerous cases, that heightened scrutiny should be applied whenever laws explicitly
discriminate on the basis of gender.”).
191
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693–94.
192
Id. at 1691–93 (internal quotations omitted).
186
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governmental interest is served by laws grounded” in this notion, the Court
concluded that the government’s purported interests193 did not provide an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for the gender-specific residency and
age criteria, and that the provisions therefore violated the Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause.194
The Court’s remedy for the constitutional infirmity, however, differed
drastically from the Second Circuit’s remedial course and the Court’s equal
protection remedial history. Rather than extending the one-year physicalpresence requirement to all unwed U.S.-citizen parents, the Court severed
the one-year exception and preserved the current five-year physical presence
requirement, making it prospectively applicable to unwed U.S. citizen
fathers and mothers.195 While acknowledging its long-standing practice of
“extension, rather than nullification” of a federal benefit to remedy an equal
protection violation,196 the Court noted that the legislature’s intent governs
the remedial course chosen.197 Even more, when the discriminatory scheme
involves an exception that encompasses the favorable treatment—i.e., the
benefit—the Court must further “consider the degree of potential disruption
of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to
abrogation” of the exception.198
In finding that Congress would nullify the one-year exception and
preserve the general rule if Congress were aware of the constitutional
infirmity, the Court focused primarily on two factors.199 First, Congress’s
inclusion of a more arduous physical presence requirement as the general
rule suggests that it deemed actual residence in the United States to be of
great importance.200 Second, the extension of the one-year exception to
unwed U.S.-citizen fathers would significantly disrupt the statutory scheme,
creating an anomaly whereby marital children receive “[d]isadvantageous
193

See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text.
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1695–96, 1698 (“One cannot see in this driven-bygender scheme the close means-end fit required to survive heightened scrutiny.”).
195
Id. at 1700–01, 1698 (“[T]his Court is not equipped to grant the relief Morales-Santana
seeks, i.e., extending to [Morales-Santana’s] father (and, derivatively, to him) the benefit of
the one-year physical presence term § 1409(c) reserves for unwed mothers.”) (emphasis
added).
196
Id. at 1698–99; see also Oral Argument at 22:55, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S.
Ct. 1678 (2017) (No. 15-1191), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1191 (affirming the
Supreme Court’s practice of leveling up rather than leveling down in response to an equal
protection violation and finding “one compelling reason to do it [in this case],” namely that
“in this case, unlike in some cases, there really isn’t a choice between leveling up and leveling
down . . . because if you level down, [Morales-Santana] gets no relief.”).
197
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1699.
198
Id. at 1700 (“In making this assessment, a court should ‘measure the intensity of
commitment to the’ . . . main rule . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
199
Id.
200
Id.
194
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treatment . . . in comparison to nonmarital children.”201 Accordingly, the
Court abrogated § 1409(c)’s more beneficial requirement and extended the
current “five-year requirement . . . prospectively, to children born to unwed
U.S.-citizen mothers,” leaving Morales-Santana without a remedy.202 Still,
the Court deferred to Congress to “settle on a uniform prescription that
neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.”203
At least two things are certain after Morales-Santana. First, the Court’s
decision provided Morales-Santana a victory without a remedy.204 While the
Court considered the equal protection challenge to §§ 1401 and 1409
meritorious, the Court’s method of remedying the constitutional infirmity—
namely, nullifying the one-year exception for unwed mothers and extending
the five-year residency requirement to both unwed mothers and unwed
fathers—left Morales-Santana without relief.205 Because the Court did not
modify the five-year residency requirement for unwed fathers and because
Morales-Santana’s father did not originally satisfy such requirement,206 the
Court’s remedial course left Morales-Santana unqualified for U.S.
citizenship and, thus, still subject to deportation; the very circumstance he
wished to avoid in raising this equal protection challenge. Second, postMorales-Santana, children born abroad to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers will
face a more onerous process when seeking to acquire derivative U.S.
citizenship insofar as they are now also subject to the five-year physical
presence requirement. This difficulty will endure unless and until Congress
intervenes to affirm its intent and settle on a different prescription.207
201

Id. The Court added that this “is scarcely a purpose one can sensibly attribute to
Congress.” Id.
202
Id. at 1701.
203
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1701. The Court’s chosen remedial course is to be
upheld “in the interim” until Congress addresses the issue. Id.
204
See Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Rejects Gender-Based Distinctions in
Citizenship Laws, SCOTUSBLOG (June 12, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinio
n-analysis-court-rejects-gender-based-distinctions-citizenship-laws/ (arguing that the Court’s
decision “was a hollow victory for Luis Ramon Morales-Santana” and that the “ruling may
not help Morales-Santana . . . ward off deportation”).
205
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1698 (“[T]his Court is not equipped to grant the relief
Morales-Santana seeks, i.e., extending to his father (and, derivatively, to him) the benefit of
the one-year physical-presence term § 1409(c) reserves for unwed mothers.); see also
Thomas, supra note 16, at 8 (“What was shocking was the Court’s decision in MoralesSantana to deny any meaningful remedy to the [P]laintiff who had proven such anachronistic
discrimination. The [P]laintiff effectively lost because the Court refused to grant the
requested remedy of applying the one year rule for unwed women to unwed men.”).
206
Recall that Morales-Santana necessarily challenged the ten-year requirement as it
existed in the 1952 Act at the time of his birth. See supra notes 6 and 170.
207
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1701 (leaving open the possibility that “Congress may
address the issue and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages
any person on the basis of gender.”); see also Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of
Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209, 226 (2015) (“If Congress disagrees with a
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V. TOWARDS EXTENDING, RATHER THAN LIMITING, THE BENEFIT
In the months since Morales-Santana, commentators have roused
different assessments of the Court’s decision. Some commentators argue
that the Court’s outright refusal to submit to Congress’s plenary power
signals an erosion of the Court’s longstanding deference to the political
branches in immigration matters.208 Other commentators focus on the
Court’s decision to apply the harsher five-year physical-presence
requirement equally to unwed fathers and mothers, contending that it does
not comport with the Court’s established practice of remedying an equal
protection violation by extending the particular benefit rather than nullifying
it.209
This Comment argues that the Court should have remedied the
constitutional violation in Morales-Santana by extending, rather than
abrogating, the statutory benefit, thereby treating all non-marital children
equally in accordance with Congress’s seeming intent to provide preferential
treatment to this group of children.210 Notably, if Congress thought it
justifiable to treat the foreign-born children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers
preferably by way of the one-year exception (in the same way that it provides
preferential treatment to a variety of groups in other forms of legislation), it
is not implausible that Congress would admit similar treatment for children
of unwed U.S.-citizen fathers.211 Still, the Court’s refusal to extend the oneyear exception to the nonmarital children of U.S.-citizen fathers does not
indicate a decreased deference to Congress in immigration matters. Instead,
the plenary power continues to influence the Court’s decisions, albeit in a
limited way when equal protection principles are involved.212

judicial decision or wants to change the law for other reasons, it is the legislature’s
responsibility to amend the statute pursuant to the constitutionally mandated procedures.”).
208
See supra note 12.
209
See Bridget Crawford, Is Ginsburg’s Decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana Good
for Women?, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (June 12, 2017), http://www.feministlaw
professors.com/2017/06/is-ginsburgs-decision-in-sessions-v-morales-santana-good-forwomen/; Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Just Made Our Ugly, Messed-Up Immigration
Law Even Uglier, THINK PROGRESS (June 12, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/scotusimmigration-gender-bf65cebccf9d/; supra note 15; Thomas, supra note 16.
210
In other words, the Court should have affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit’s decision insofar as the Circuit Court found an equal protection violation,
but remedied it by extending the one-year exception to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers. See Lynch
v. Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016).
211
See id. The Second Circuit concluded that leveling up was the right course. Id.; see
also Thomas, supra note 16, at 9 (“[A] court could just as easily have discerned a different
intent for Congress, as the Second Circuit did in the same case below. The appellate court
severed the longer general rule for unwed fathers, leaving in place a gender-neutral one-year
rule that then applied to all unwed parents.”).
212
See Robinson, supra note 14; see also Collins, supra note 10, at 175.
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A. The INA—An Exception to the General Rule and an Argument for
Leveling Up
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets forth provisions for
admission, deportation, and nationality.213 While the INA’s existing
provisions address a host of concerns, the provisions at issue in MoralesSantana—and thus relevant to this Comment—are those that provide a
framework for acquisition of U.S. citizenship at birth by a child born abroad
to a U.S.-citizen parent.214 The INA contains a clear statement of
congressional intent: “A person may only be naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this
subchapter and not otherwise.”215 Specifically, §§ 1401 and 1409 of the INA
provide the primary rules for determining who “shall be nationals and
citizens of the United States at birth” by instituting residency and physicalpresence requirements contingent on the parents’ nationality and marital
status, among other things.216
In particular, § 1401 provides for the U.S. citizenship of a child born
abroad to married parents “one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen
of the United States who . . . was physically present in the United States” for
at least ten years prior to the child’s birth.217 Furthermore, § 1409 adopts the
physical-presence requirements of § 1401 and makes them applicable to
unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, “thereby allowing an acknowledged unwed
citizen parent to transmit U.S. citizenship to a foreign-born child under the
same terms as a married citizen parent.”218 Section 1409(c), however, makes
an exception to this residency requirement for unwed U.S.-citizen
mothers.219 Under § 1409(c)’s exception, unwed mothers may transfer
citizenship to their foreign-born children so long as they were continuously
present in the United States for one year.220
As noted by Justice Ginsburg in Morales-Santana, § 1409(c) is unique
in that it is the exception to the general rule for acquisition of citizenship at
213
See The Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163–64 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018)) (providing that the purpose of the
INA was “[t]o revise the laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality”); see
also Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV.,
https://www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act (last visited Mar. 13, 2019)
(explaining that the INA “collected many provisions and reorganized the structure of
immigration law. [It] has been amended many times over the years, but is still the basic body
of immigration law.”).
214
8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2018).
215
8 U.S.C. § 1421(d) (emphasis added).
216
See § 1401(a)(7) (now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018)); see also §1409(a).
217
Id. The residency requirement has since been reduced to five years.
218
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2017); see also 8 U.S.C. §1409.
219
8 U.S.C. §1409(c).
220
Id.
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birth.221 In other words, the five-year residency requirement is applicable to
married U.S.-citizen parents and unwed U.S.-citizen fathers; however,
unwed U.S.-citizen mothers are excepted from this general rule and are
instead subject to a one-year residency requirement. Furthermore, the
general framework for acquisition of U.S.-citizenship at birth by a child born
abroad is likewise unique insofar as there are three groups involved rather
than two—namely, children of (1) married U.S.-citizen parents; (2) unwed
U.S.-citizen fathers; and (3) unwed U.S.-citizen mothers. These factors,
according to the Morales-Santana Court, made leveling up to remedy the
equal protection violation problematic.222
Seemingly, the Court’s difficulty in choosing nullification—rather than
extension—as the appropriate remedy arose in reaction to two issues. First,
when the Court has previously considered an equal protection challenge to a
discriminatory exception, the exception generally “den[ied] benefits to
discrete groups” that were available to others under the general rule.223 Thus,
when the Court struck down such an exception as unconstitutional, the result
was an extension of benefits that were previously denied. In contrast, the
Morales-Santana Court dealt with a discriminatory exception that
extended—rather than denied—a benefit to a discrete group; namely, U.S.citizen mothers enjoyed a one-year exception to the more arduous five-year
requirement.224 Faced with this perplexity, the Court, “serv[ing] as a shortterm surrogate for the legislature,”225 considered whether Congress “would
have struck [the] exception and applied the general rule equally to all, or
instead, would have broadened the exception to cure the equal protection
violation.”226 Quoting Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Welsh v.
United States, the Morales-Santana Court added that in making this
assessment, it must “measure the intensity of commitment to the residual
policy and consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme
that would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation.”227 The Court then
concluded that the longer physical-presence requirement—the residual
policy—”evidences Congress’ recognition of ‘the importance of residence
in this country as the talisman of dedicated attachment,’” and that the
221

Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1687.
Id. at 1699–1700.
223
Id. at 1699 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202–04, 213–17 (1976);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 630–631, 637–38, (1974); Dep’t of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529–30, 538 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678–79
(1973).
224
Id.
225
See Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 317.
226
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700.
227
Id. (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
222
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disruption of such a statutory scheme by extending the one-year exception
could be “large.”228
Second, tied to a potential disruption of the statutory scheme was the
Court’s concern that if it remedied the constitutional violation by leveling up
and extending § 1409(c)’s one-year exception to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers,
the longer residency requirement would remain applicable to married U.S.citizen parents.229 Because the statutory scheme at issue in Morales-Santana
involves three groups, the Court did not face the simpler task of treating two
classes equally. Instead, by providing equally favorable treatment to U.S.citizen fathers and mothers, married parents—the third group—would be
subject to the more stringent residency requirement and thereby treated less
favorably. This result, according to the Court, would be anomalous.230 The
“[d]isadvantageous treatment of marital children in comparison to
nonmarital children is scarcely a purpose one can sensibly attribute to
Congress.”231 Even more, this remedy could give rise to a separate
constitutional violation—the unequal treatment of married parents in
juxtaposition to that of unmarried parents.
Nevertheless, the potentially jarring result from extending the one-year
exception to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers should not have prevented the
Morales-Santana Court from leveling up to remedy the constitutional
violation. The Court could have adopted a relatively straightforward
solution: extend the one-year exception to all parents, married or unmarried,
unless and until the statute were changed by Congress. Going forward,
Congress would still be free to choose a different requirement applicable to
all genders and all marital statuses.232 The Supreme Court’s choice of
judicial alteration to the statute in the interim creates more problems than it
solves.
B. Preferential Treatment in Immigration Laws
A law’s preferential treatment of one group in comparison to another is
not entirely anomalous, particularly in the context of immigration. United
States’ immigration laws have historically given preferential treatment to
different groups of people. The laws treat certain groups more favorably for
a variety of reasons, ranging from protectionist purposes to longstanding
228
Id. (“Put to the choice, Congress, we believe, would have abrogated § 1409(c)’s
exception, preferring preservation of the general rule.” (quoting Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S.
815, 834 (1971))).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, examining the same record
that was before the Supreme Court, concluded that leveling up was the right course, so it is
not as though a case cannot be made for that approach.
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political agreements. A significant example of such differential treatment is
that of Cuban immigrants, who received special status under U.S.
immigration laws as a result of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (“Act”).233
Originally instituted to provide a safe harbor to those fleeing persecution
under Fidel Castro’s regime, the Act made it significantly easier for a Cuban
to enter the country lawfully in comparison to immigrants from other
countries.234 A separate example of such preferential treatment is evidenced
in the differential treatment of spouses, children, and parents under the
Violence Against Women’s Act (“VAWA”) provisions in the INA who face
removal proceedings and who are victims of domestic abuse.235 These
provisions afford benefits to abused foreign nationals, such as permitting
them to self-petition for lawful permanent resident status, that are not
otherwise available to foreign nationals who do not face such abuse.236
Accordingly, Congress has provided for preferential treatment of different
groups and, thus, providing for such in Morales-Santana so as to create a
situation in which marital children have more stringent requirements would
not produce an entirely anomalous result.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Morales-Santana, some
commentators critiqued the Court’s constitutional analysis and remedy as
signaling a continued erosion of Congress’s plenary power over immigration
matters, while others critiqued the Court’s contravention of its long-standing
practice of extending, rather than nullifying, a benefit to remedy an equal
protection violation. This Comment contends that the Court’s remedy in
Morales-Santana was improper, and that the Court should have extended,
rather than limited, the benefit to remedy the constitutional infirmity.
Further, while recent Supreme Court decisions have seemed to signal a
“chipping away” at Congress’s plenary power over immigration policies, it
is more probable that Congress’s plenary power is instead yielding to certain
constitutional principles.

233

See Henry Cuellar, Stop Preferential Treatment for Cuban Immigrants, WASH.
(Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/stop-preferentialtreatment-for-cuban-immigrants/article/2586889.
234
Id.
235
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Provides Protections for Immigrant Women and
Victims of Crime: Fact Sheet, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 7, 2012),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/violence-against-women-act-vawaprovides-protections-immigrant-women-and-victims-crime.
236
Id.
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